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INTRODUCTION 
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE JUST PRICE: 
HISTORY, ETHNOGRAPHY, CRITIQUE 
 
Peter Luetchford and Giovanni Orlando 
 
 
Introduction 
Two elements of contemporary life, price and justice, are central to this Volume. The first of 
these, price, is pervasive: from food and rent to gas, water and electricity; from the cost of 
petrol to that of agricultural inputs, healthcare and education; from VAT to insurance, wages 
and bonuses. Every time we interact with these entities—enjoying, enduring or resisting 
them—we encounter prices. This encounter takes place through an incredibly complex web 
of material and informational channels that tend to naturalize prices; and yet, against the 
tendency to accept these as given, all the chapters in this Volume document political and 
ethical struggles over prices.  
The second theme of the Volume, justice, asks us to engage with those struggles. If the 
world is “overheating” (Eriksen, 2016), prices may be the spark that ignites the fuse. This 
happened during tumultuous events such as the global financial crash of 2008 (the price of 
collateralized debt obligations) and the Arab spring of 2011 (the price of basic foodstuffs). 
These phenomena are not entirely new, of course. In the developing world, price-related 
“austerity riots” have been one of the chief consequences of neoliberal policies for more than 
forty years now (Walton & Seddon, 1994). The financial crash of 1929 led to a whole new way 
of dealing with markets and prices, the New Deal and the Bretton Woods agreements. The 
development of capitalism itself was partly the result of a long-term “price revolution” that cost 
hundreds of thousands of people their livelihoods, transforming them into the masses who 
manned the factories of the first industrial age (Graeber, 2011). But the present era is different. 
Trade through the use of money is now a global phenomenon. The creative energies of people 
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and nature today are bought and sold millions of times a day on myriad different markets—for 
a price.  
Saying unequivocally what prices are is far from straightforward, however. A simple answer 
would be that they are quantities of money most often expressed in Arabic numerals. Yet this 
is clearly unsatisfactory (Guyer et al., 2010; Zaloom, 2003). Prices are ciphers for a complex 
entanglement of actors, relations, ideologies, things and environments. In a broad sense, 
prices appear to be consubstantial to our discipline, an intuition confirmed by the work of some 
of its earliest practitioners (Malinowski & de la Fuente, 1982).1 It is thus somewhat surprising 
that there has been limited work in the discipline on the values and practices that contest 
mechanisms and outcomes of pricing, and on people’s everyday political, social and ethical 
negotiations in search of just prices. Of course, anthropology does have a long history of 
documenting the corrosive effect of price-making markets on social life (e.g. Bohannan, 1955; 
Browne & Milgram, 2009; Polanyi, 1944/2001; Taussig, 1980). Most commonly, this is 
articulated through binary oppositions between gifts and commodities, personal relations and 
alienated ones, or mutuality and self-interest. Part of our remit in this Introduction is to break 
down this binary either/or approach to economic life. 
Indeed, the chapters in this Volume describe people in a wide range of circumstances and 
with different agendas, employing multiple strategies and, perhaps more importantly, 
creatively combining them as they negotiate economic life in search of just prices for the 
products of their labor, and refuge from unfair market practices. The contributions provide 
diverse examples of this reality, from the scrap metal trade in Ankara (Dinler), to markets in 
Equatorial Guinea (Valenciano-Mañé) and the rose oil industry in Isparta (Yalçın-Heckmann). 
In rural Nicaragua (Ripoll), Tuscany (Pratt), and Spain (Luetchford), we discover how farmers 
and agricultural workers struggle and strategize around prices, in and outside markets. We 
also learn of struggles for just wages by human rights advocates on behalf of Bangladeshi 
garment workers (Prentice) and by fair trade customers in Sicily (Orlando). 
The remainder of this Introduction is dedicated to interrogating analyses, discourses and 
contestations over price, both historically and within anthropology. After reflecting on the 
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relation of the just price to the more general question of commensuration and price 
composition, we turn to Aristotle, who first wrestled with the politics and ethics of prices. We 
then show how his legacy developed into a discussion about criteria for determining a just 
price in the modern period, with the advance of capitalism. From there, we consider 
approaches to commensuration and price composition as these relate to anthropology, and 
the bearing these concepts have on discussions of just prices. 
 
In search of the just price 
Economic thought itself has roots in price theory, insofar as its origins lie in speculations about 
value in a society that increasingly used money in commercial markets: Aristotle’s Greece. 
Most thinkers, though, saw price and value as distinct until about 1870 (Graeber, 2005, pp. 
439–440; Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 143). Economists of the Marginalist School (to whom we 
return later) then conflated the two meanings, and it is in this sense that value can still be said 
to be central to their endeavors. “Value theory—the explanation of how prices are formed in a 
market economy … —has long been central to economic analysis qua analysis” (Wilson, 
1975, p. 56, our emphasis). In contrast, for anthropologists 
the promise of value theory has always been to do much more. It has been to understand the workings of 
any system of exchange (including free-market capitalism) as part of larger systems of meaning … . [This] 
meant that the kind of moral and ethical questions that Aquinas or Smith felt were at the heart of the matter 
could not simply be pushed aside (Graeber, 2005, p. 443). 
Prices, then, are “conveyors of value” (De Neve, Luetchford, & Pratt, 2008, p. 15), but not 
in the restricted sense denoted by free-market economists (of information about supply and 
demand). Prices raise political and ethical questions that are ultimately questions of justice, 
hence our title for the Volume. The reason for this is that prices imply an equivalence of sorts 
between the things being exchanged. They combine different objects or activities into a single 
number, an abstraction through which they become somewhat alike. Through prices, the 
“alchemy” of trade transforms one thing into another (Gudeman, 2008, p. 55); like alchemy, 
this power raises suspicion.  
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Accordingly, to interrogate the just price, we question the basis upon which two qualitatively 
distinct things can be compared both to each other (any two things) but especially, in the 
presence of markets, to money (this thing to this price). The problem in question can be posed 
in terms of “commensuration,” whereby the criteria employed to validate or contest 
comparison establish the grounds for determining a just price (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 
315; Grossberg, 2010; Gudeman, 2008, p. 51; Mei, 2009, p. 527; Meikle, 1995, p. 21). In other 
words, on what basis and under what circumstance might a price, or indeed any price, be 
deemed acceptable, appropriate, or just? 
There is also a second reason that prices inevitably raise questions of justice. A price does 
not simply transform one thing (work) into another (money, commodities); it also embodies the 
social relations that ultimately determine how commensuration is performed and prices are 
formed (Roitman, 2005, p. 83). But it does so covertly. Prices reflect relations of power and 
yet, as abstractions, they don’t. A price appears to be a singular amount; in fact, this is a 
fiction, because all prices are composites (Guyer, 2009). From the price of what they sell, 
corporations need to pay the factors of production (including labor), shareholders, 
management, and taxes (states). Competing with each other for who can do so more 
efficiently, they squeeze out value where they see fit, thus changing the composition of the 
fictitious price of a pint of milk, a smartphone or a t-shirt. The incredibly unequal world we live 
in means that the way prices are composed is subject to deep injustices and to the political 
contestations that these generate (Guyer, 2009, pp. 203, 206). 
In a sense, the problem of price composition represents an extension of the 
commensuration one, as the many hidden portions that make up a price effectively multiply 
the problem of how to suitably match their numeric (monetary) value to objects and actions in 
the real world. Such dilemmas might be solved both positively and negatively. Positively, by 
referring to some version of natural law and to allegedly objective, universal measures of value 
like equilibrium between supply and demand or labor value, but also by employing more 
situated, relative criteria that consider morality, customary practice and vernacular knowledge. 
They can be solved negatively, by believing that some things are unquantifiable and therefore 
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untradeable, or by turning the problem on its head and declaring that prices determine 
commensuration, not the other way around. Crucially, we suggest it is often the clash between 
the two positive solutions—as when the social valuation of the worth of something departs 
from its given market price—that leads to disputes over what constitutes a just price and, if 
these remain unsettled, to the negative solution—the impossibility of determining a just price. 
In this Introduction, therefore, we propose answers to the question of commensuration 
which comprise, but are not limited to, supply and demand, cost of production (especially 
labor), the social relationships through which prices are refracted, and the possibility that no 
commensuration is tenable. Our argument is that these different interpretations and 
resolutions to the commensuration problem co-exist and overlap in real life, and that people 
negotiate through them using multiple discursive and practical repertoires. 
As many people experience, including those documented in the chapters that follow, 
answers to conceptual questions have real consequences. Policies that promote price 
formation through supply and demand have generated both enormous wealth and great 
inequality. A number of strategies are open to people who face these forces. One is to “play 
the market game” in what is an uneven playing field. The spread of “calculative reason” has 
repercussions at the level of individual and collective psychology (Gudeman, 2016, p. 116). 
Many of us feel that to be successful in life we have to compete by calculating the “price” of 
our actions in terms of different possible outcomes, avoiding choices that could “cost” us dear. 
Within this sort of game, the just price is often the cheapest price to the consumer, or the 
highest return on investment to the producer. This leaves many people marginalized, 
struggling to make ends meet. A way to mitigate such marginalization is to valorize one’s own 
labor, knowledge and skill in socially circumscribed markets (sometimes creating local 
monopolies) and to capitalize on personal qualities and social attributes. In such 
circumstances, a price may be considered “just” in as much as it is a “good” market price. 
Another strategy is to seek a just price not in open competition, but indirectly, as reparation 
for the uneven effects of that competitive process. This may take the form of the upheavals 
documented by Thompson (1991) in eighteenth century England and of their contemporary 
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equivalents; a way of demanding that governments or the powerful regulate markets and 
protect people from unaffordable prices, or that welfare payments, corporate compensation, 
and charity are offered under a social-democratic or liberal government. 
A third response is informed by the conviction that exchange value and quantification are 
logically, and thus morally, flawed. One way to gauge this position is to say that 
commensuration enforces equivalence between the incommensurate or the 
incommensurable. This response can lead to suspicion toward commercial activity and the 
creation of areas of life in which unquantified and unquantifiable use values and creative 
energies are emphasized. In the next section we look at the origins of the discussion on 
commensuration in Ancient Greece. 
 
Aristotle and the problem of commensuration 
Although he didn’t actually use the term,2 Aristotle provides the starting point for discussions 
of the just price. This is because his distinction between use and exchange value, and the 
moral problematisation of trade that he drew from it, have stimulated debates about the politics 
and ethics of economy down the ages. In discussing Aristotle we are not arguing for or against 
any specific theory of value or exchange, nor do we wish to suggest that the Aristotelian legacy 
can cover all the contemporary approaches to the issue of the just price.3 Furthermore, as the 
chapters in this Volume attest, scholarly notions of the just price are not the only voices in the 
debate; popular ones are always present alongside them. Beginning with Aristotle is then 
simply a useful way of setting out different views on commensuration and how these lead to 
different conclusions about how to justify prices.  
Aristotle lived in a society largely built on a rural economy geared toward subsistence and 
household reproduction, which was however witnessing the rapid spread of commercial 
activities (Hann & Hart, 2011, pp. 19–20; Meikle, 1995; Polanyi, 1957a). This situation 
compelled him to consider moral issues emerging in this transition. His signature contribution, 
in our reading, was to distinguish between production for use and production for exchange, 
and to make ethical judgments about consequent economic activities (Booth, 1993). These 
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included householding (subsistence activities) and trading (selling goods for a profit). The 
distinction between householding and money-making was, for Polanyi, “probably the most 
prophetic pointer ever made in the realm of the social sciences” (2001, p. 56). Others credit 
this distinction with laying the foundations of economic thought (Gregory, 2011, p. 136; Meikle, 
1995, p. 8). 
In part one of The Politics, Aristotle argued that objects are made for specific ends, and 
proper use should reflect their natures (Mei, 2009, p. 530; Meikle, 1995, p. 36). For example, 
there are two ways of using a shoe—to wear it or to sell it—but the correct one is to wear it, 
as the shoe is not made expressly for purposes of exchange (Aristotle, 1992, pp. 81–82). Here 
Aristotle clearly privileged the dominant social structures of his time. The “natural” and 
“unnatural” uses of objects are then refracted into economic forms (p. 78). The household 
carries moral approval, while disdain is attached to trade. Exchanges between households 
are necessary; when they are direct, such as wine for corn, they adjust natural imbalances 
and are thus legitimate. More problematic is adjustment through money. This can facilitate 
exchange between households, still an acceptable endeavor, but can also lead to selling for 
profit, an unnatural human pursuit for Aristotle (1992, pp. 82–85; see also Baeck, 1994, pp. 
77–80). 
The Politics problematizes the distinction between use and exchange, which as we see 
below, led Marx to identify a gulf between them. This distinction posed a problem for trade, 
especially in a society in which excessive money-making threatened the relations of the polis. 
In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle thus turned his attention to justice, arguing that exchange 
holds people together but that in order to do so it must be proportionate—just—expressing a 
ratio that takes into account differences between people and their products (2004, p. 124). He 
expressed this problem in the famous yet cryptic formula “the number of shoes exchanged for 
a house must correspond to the ratio of builder to shoemaker” (p. 125). From this statement 
we get a principle of equivalence based upon proportionality, but what that is remains open to 
interpretation. 
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A literal expression of proportionality might mean that a fair price is based on exchange of 
“like for like” by volume or weight—a sack of maize for a sack of beans, for example (Gudeman 
& Rivera, 1990, p. 144). Aristotle’s choice of words, however, points in the opposite direction, 
that of (the difficulty of) establishing a fair basis for exchanging things that seem completely 
different from each other (Baeck, 1994, pp. 87–88). While the ancient text will always remain 
somewhat opaque, it could mean that a just price should reflect the usefulness of an object 
and the different market prices that ensue from it (having a house is more important than 
having a shoe), or the different costs of producing goods in terms of labor and materials (it 
takes more effort to build a house than to make a shoe), or maybe the different social 
standings of the parties involved (builders are more important than shoemakers). 
The latter interpretation seems particularly relevant, considering that Aristotle placed great 
emphasis on the preservation of traditional social roles. It is thus not unreasonable to assume 
that he favored an approach in which “social relationships, a scheme of value, and knowledge 
of the other precede and set the conditions for the exchange” (Gudeman, 2001, p. 62). This 
view of economy is basically the reverse of the modern one, in which parties are thought to 
be impersonal; but as we shall see further below, the idea that social relationships should 
determine the terms of exchange is far from extinct. An alternative approach to the view that 
a just price can be established by proportion, and so reduced to a formula, is the belief that 
money cannot, by its nature, be a medium for just exchanges, because qualities cannot be 
reduced to quantities. Here we have an antinomy between use and exchange value. If this is 
true, then both commensuration and a just price become logically impossible. 
In sum, the problem of the just price, we suggest, is the result of there being no definitive 
answer to the conundrum posed by Aristotle of how to reduce things with qualitatively different 
uses, such as houses and shoes, to a common quantitative denominator (money) that allows 
them to be fairly exchanged. Aristotle’s legacy has been developed in different directions over 
more than two millennia, a timespan during which society and economy changed radically. 
Discussions about the just price have both influenced and reflected these dramatic changes, 
bringing new voices to the debate in the process. 
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In the next four sections we lay out competing resolutions to the problem. Two points should 
preface this discussion. The first is that we focus on the Christian West, while acknowledging 
that other religious traditions have made important contributions to the debate.4 Nevertheless, 
the two contributions focusing on Turkey (Dinler, and Yalçın-Heckmann, this volume) 
recognize the power of markets and Western ideas concerning prices even in avowedly 
Islamic contexts.  
The second proviso is that an important distinction needs to be made early on between 
modernist, positivist understandings of the just price based on universal principles, and 
readings that situate it within concrete and contested socio-historical relations, as part of 
actually existing markets. In the English language this distinction is partly reflected in the 
debate’s terminology through the difference in meaning between the noun “commensuration,” 
as an equivalence obtained via an objective metric, and the adjective “commensurate,” as an 
indication that something is suitable to one’s needs. To say that there is commensuration 
between two amounts of food is not the same as saying that one amount is commensurate 
with my needs. The distinction between universal and situated approaches is useful for 
organizing the discussion, though in practice the positivist pretensions of modernist framings 
unsettle, and are unsettled by, people’s actual market practices and ethical engagements. 
Two universal measures of value arose to explain prices in the Modern Age, consumer 
utility and cost of production; we address these in turn in the following two sections. 
 
The just price as market value 
In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith (1776/1976) argued for the positive social role of 
markets. Together with other important thinkers such as Locke and Hume, Smith believed that 
the development of a commercial society would advance civilization—a far cry from Aristotle’s 
position (Hirschman, 1977/2013). These thinkers thought that society was becoming more 
impersonal and people more self-interested, and that this was not necessarily a bad thing.5 
Smith famously said that we should not expect our food from the benevolence of the butcher 
or the baker, but from their regard to their own interest. All men have a natural propensity to 
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truck, barter and exchange. As we shall see below, most anthropologists working on exchange 
are engaged in a critical dialogue with these voices from classical political economy. Smith 
argued that prices depended from the sum of wages, profits and rents on which an economy 
settles in the long run under free-market conditions. This he called the “natural price,” to 
distinguish it from short-term fluctuations. While he strongly approved of trade and markets, 
Smith did so in the belief that people would ultimately be justly rewarded for their efforts. The 
famous “invisible hand” that would produce this optimal result was, after all, explicitly the hand 
of Divine Providence, something that economists today regularly fail to acknowledge 
(Graeber, 2005, p. 442; Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 26). Smith’s normative argument thus 
resembles a notion of the just price (Johnson, 1938, p. 172). 
Almost a century later, in the 1870s, William Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras and Carl Menger 
revolutionized Smith’s argument, developing the theory of Marginalism. Their approach 
became known as “neo-classical” because it still celebrated markets as the source of all 
economic wealth (as Smith had), but it abandoned the classical view of value as an almost 
cosmological property. According to Marginalism, consumer utility is the only true measure of 
value. This is determined entirely by the satisfaction that comes with consuming, especially 
by comparing the marginal utility of one good to that of another. Total utility is the absolute 
usefulness of an object. For the Marginalists, however, consumers do not value this absolute 
usefulness; they value differences in the relative (marginal) utility they can gain from different 
goods in relation to their prices (Barrera, 1997, pp. 87–88; Gregory, 1997, 18–19). In this 
account, people consume products to the point where the satisfaction per dollar spent on one 
good is equal to the satisfaction per dollar spent on another good, so that each additional unit 
of a product yields only decreasing increments (margins) in satisfaction. People thus need to 
compare and contrast—commensurate—different goods. “Individuals order their preferences 
[and] the ordering must be transitive. … In addition to being transitive, preferences are rational 
when … all the options can be compared” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 53). Given these premises, the 
market price of any good is the lowest amount a potential consumer is prepared to pay for it. 
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In contrast to Marx, who saw value as a social average (see below), the Marginalists saw 
it as an increment at the margin of an actor’s total assets and focused on “the subjective 
calculations of individuals seeking to maximize their own utility” (Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 37). 
The political and social aspects of economic activity were thus set aside, with far-reaching 
consequences. Utility, as expressed in consumer preference, replaced the notion of use value; 
price, as determined by supply and demand, replaced exchange value. Effectively, this made 
Aristotle’s distinction between the two meanings of value redundant; consumer preference is 
expressed in market demand, which determines the prices at which things exchange 
(Gudeman, 2001, p. 16 and 2016, p. 111). The Marginalist School, then, “simply tossed the 
problem [of value] aside by redefining economics as the study of price formation” (Graeber, 
2005, pp. 443). 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the market model based on individual rational 
choice has “solidified its hold in Western culture” (Carrier, 1997, p. 1); as a result, anthropology 
has paid increasing attention to cultures of capitalism and “proto-capitalisms.” At least two 
premises inform this literature. One is that economic rationality is geared toward making gains 
in multiple, shifting, and sometimes overlapping or competing scales of value. This holds in 
domestic contexts involving uses of money (Zelizer, 1994) as it does in transactions in wider 
contexts (Guyer, 2004). Underlying these interpretations, and largely unspoken, is the 
assumption that people naturally desire to accumulate through the medium of money 
(Graeber, 2001, pp. 30–33). A second premise is that, because exchange presupposes 
commensuration (Guyer, 2004, p. 20), a just price must simply be that which people pay, so 
that money moves from being a unit of account to a scale of value. The value of an object is 
denoted by its price, which is thereby fetishized (Gudeman, 2008, p. 48). Consequently, 
exchanges create a bridge between the two kinds of “value” and the word itself comes to be 
used in a very general way, obscuring the distinction between use and exchange (Miller, 
2006). The combined effect is increasing levels of abstraction as people relate to others 
through the exchange value of commodities understood as consumer utility (Marx, 1867/1990; 
Miller, 1998). 
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All of the contributors in this Volume are concerned at some level with market prices 
established under the aegis of supply-and-demand, and the opportunities and constraints 
afforded by economic ideologies and practices of the rational choice model. For example, 
Dinler shows how scrap metal traders prefer current market prices and rail against government 
regulation and control, while Yalçın-Heckmann shows how local rose growers and traders are 
largely mystified by, yet critical of, “veiled” abstract markets. For Luetchford, and for Pratt, by 
contrast, there are opportunities to generate local or regional monopolies by attaching specific 
qualities to products that consumers demand. In this process, producers and workers can 
command premiums that may be considered just, in as much as they allow meaningful 
livelihoods to be made. At the same time, many of the people in the empirical case studies 
struggle to make ends meet. Ripoll’s Nicaraguan campesinos, for example, expect 
government to intervene to control market prices that both squeeze out grain producers and 
make prices for those same commodities unaffordable to consumers. As Gudeman and Rivera 
note, “the folk continue to articulate the hope for fair exchanges” (1990, p. 145). This leads to 
the critique of marginal utility as the basis for commensuration. 
 
The just price as labor value 
While consumer demand has become the dominant yardstick of value to explain prices, other 
thinkers have sought alternative measures in the cost of production. This notion, and its 
attendant focus on human labor,6 emerged in the Middle Ages with the Scholastics and was 
later picked up by Smith.7 Karl Marx, however, put it center stage, developing the other great 
theory of value that dominated Modernity. 
Marx built his argument by drawing on Aristotle’s distinction between the domestic and the 
money economy. For him, the “natural” (peasant-like) economy was one in which a few goods 
are exchanged for money only to be turned back into goods for household consumption. In 
the capitalist economy, instead, money (capital) is turned into commodities through industrial 
production simply to be turned back into more money through trade and retail. Marx also 
expanded on the medieval tradition of “labor and expenses” (Baeck, 1994, p. 145–146; 
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Baldwin, 1959, pp. 63–67) by turning them into a universal measure, leading some to claim 
that “the descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the labor theory of value. The last of the 
Schoolmen was Karl Marx” (Tawney, 1938, p. 48). 
Although he drew on the British political economy of Smith, Locke and Ricardo, Marx 
criticized markets as the route to generate just prices. Compared to Smith, who referred to 
price somewhat interchangeably as “value” or “exchange value,” Marx (1867/1990) used price 
in reference to economic transactions and reserved the term value for the socially assigned 
importance attached to goods and services (Robotham, 2005, p. 49). For him, this value was 
indexed to human labor, a claim that reveals the importance of anchoring value, as an 
objective property, to something more stable and substantial than the superficial vagaries of 
the market. In contrast to Smith, who rejected the notion of embodied labor, Marx thought that 
the measure of a commodity’s value lay in the socially necessary labor-time required to 
produce it. In as much as each good or service embodies a proportion of the total sum of time 
required for its production, one may calculate the value of an individual house or pair of shoes 
from the sum of time it took all bricklayers to build houses and all shoemakers to make 
footwear in any particular society. From a Marxian perspective, a just price of something 
reflects its value based upon “the amount of labor invested in a given object as a specific 
proportion of the total amount of labor in the system as a whole” (Graeber, 2001, p. 55, original 
emphasis). 
For Marx, then, “when two commodities are traded, socially formed labor is actually being 
exchanged” (Gudeman, 2008, p. 53). This labor value is transformed into exchange value, 
and hence into price. Sometimes market prices reflect this value and commodity trade appears 
to be just; other times they don’t. The difficulty raised by transforming labor values into market 
prices in Marxian analysis has long been debated (e.g. Horverak, 1988). Discrepancies have 
been attributed to many factors, such as monopolies, exploitation, variation in the composition 
of capital and the ratio of labor to equipment. Leaving these issues aside, we suggest this 
difficulty is also due to the fact that the labor theory of value, like the marginal utility one, falls 
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prey to the problem of attempting a total explanation that cannot be supported by actually-
existing conditions. 
A less stringent but perhaps more useful interpretation of the Marxian argument is that it 
“provides a critical perspective on what ought to be rather than what is. The metric of … labor 
value provides a moral analysis, against which actual markets can be measured” (Gudeman, 
2008, p. 72). This broader meaning makes sense because Marx’s theory of value was not 
meant to be a theory of prices as fluctuations in supply and demand (Graeber, 2001, p. 55). 
Several chapters in the Volume highlight this legacy from Marx, which was to rebut a system 
in which labor, as mental and physical capacities, is reduced to abstract quantities to be 
bought and sold (De Neve et al., 2008, p. 14). By focusing on the extraction of surplus value, 
whereby the capitalist pays less in wages than the value of the goods workers produce, Marx 
opens up questions of exploitation in the form of unjust prices and wages under capitalism. 
Small operators, petty-capitalists, worker-consumers, the unemployed and semi-employed 
cannot sustain themselves economically; they are marginalized or driven out by pay structures 
and market environments in which they cannot compete. In the Volume, Luetchford, Pratt and 
Prentice are concerned with how these exploitative processes affect workers, while Orlando 
shows how fair trade consumers in Sicily draw on Marxian arguments. 
Marx was also the first thinker to implicitly recognize the analytical significance of price 
composites, arguing that commodities (and by extension, their prices) are fetishes: objects on 
which people fixate but that conceal the exploitative relations that make their production 
possible. We already saw that Marginalism sees prices as the objective measure of a good’s 
value. Although businesses need to cover different costs through the prices they charge 
(labor, land, capital and tax), from an economist’s perspective it makes little sense to analyze 
how different components of a price reflect (or not) its value, because this is determined by 
the interaction of supply and demand. A market price is a singular, unitary amount. Recent 
anthropological theories of price have instead been concerned with the composition of prices, 
in an effort to reveal its socio-cultural aspects (Ballestero, 2015; Besky, 2016, p. 10; Guyer, 
2009, p. 204). 
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Karl Polanyi expanded on Marx, noting how two elements of classical economic theory—
labor and land—cannot be considered commodities, as their production does not originate in 
market relationships. For this reason, he labeled them “fictitious” (1944/2001, p. 71–80). 
Polanyi’s use of this adjective can also be made for prices, because all commodities 
incorporate costs that ultimately stem from the need to pay returns on labor and land. Marx 
and Polanyi thus help us understand the intricacies of the just price by drawing attention to 
the effacement of the politics and conflicts that lie behind both the formation of prices and their 
cultural justification, including historically-determined notions of the “just price.” As Jane Guyer 
writes: “[t]he concealment of composition [is] one of the main functions of price ideologies, 
since it dampens reasonable doubt about worth and circumvents the moral and political 
commentary that might ensue from close analysis” (2009, p. 204). 
 
The just price as social value 
Neoclassical economists see no problem with applying economics to the whole spectrum of 
reality as they rely heavily on mathematical models, a-priori beliefs about human nature, 
formal thinking and imaginary examples. Economic anthropology questions this abstraction 
by letting social reality enter systematically into theory-building and by adopting the spatial 
and temporal variability of that reality—difference—as its epistemological foundation.8 The 
discipline therefore embodies a shift from a formal, philosophical approach to an empirical, 
substantive one: 
A ‘formalist’ approach emphasizes the regular operation of ideas, in this case the universal claims of 
neoclassical economics; while a ‘substantivist’ approach gives priority to the empirical content of material 
circumstances and disputes that this diversity can be adequately grasped through just one set of concepts. 
(Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 57) 
This shift applies also to speculations about the just price, in which anthropology replaces the 
thought experiments that past thinkers based their arguments on (e.g. shoes and houses) with 
the lived experience of actual people. Marx also implicitly recognized the need for this shift in 
book one of Capital when he interrupts the universalizing discussion of surplus value in favor 
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of the historical analysis of primitive accumulation. It is for this reason that Guyer writes of his 
work and that of Polanyi that “theirs were studies of practice, not only of principle” (2009, p. 
218). Listening to the “native’s point of view” about prices thus reveals an important 
contradiction in one of Marginalism’s central tenets: competitive markets are not universal, 
natural entities that can be neatly separated from the rest of society. 
A system of integrated, self-regulating markets (capitalism) has existed in some form since 
the nineteenth century, having originally developed in England. Marx was among the first to 
point to its historically and politically determined origins, showing that price-making markets 
are neither universal nor disembedded from society. In his discussion of primitive 
accumulation he focused in particular on the creation of a market for labor, calling the constant 
expansion of those who were forced to sell their energies to the capitalists “the multiplication 
of the proletariat.” This process of “conquest, enslavement, robbery, [and] murder” (Marx, 
1867/1990, p. 874) took place through price speculations and the enclosure of the commons, 
which reduced vast numbers of the population to extreme poverty, forcing them to become 
wage laborers, and thus creating the preconditions for the emergence of capitalism (Perelman, 
2000). 
Polanyi (1944/2001) expanded Marx’s historical account considerably, exploring the 
political process that led to the creation of self-regulating markets not just for labor, but also 
for land and money (Halperin, 1984). By the time of Smith, he argued, regional and national 
markets of this kind had begun developing, signaling the rise of a commercial society in which 
the price of labor and land was no longer fixed by central authority, as had been the case 
during feudalism: “The rent due to the landlord as well as the wages of the agricultural laborer 
began to show a dependence on [grain] prices” (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 120). Smith as 
spokesperson for this new kind of society, argued for people’s natural propensity to barter. 
Reflecting on the long age of mercantile trade that preceded capitalism, Polanyi questioned 
this account: 
The orthodox teaching started from the individual’s propensity to barter; deduced from it the necessity of 
local markets … and inferred, finally, the necessity of trade … . The true starting point is long-distance trade, 
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a result of … the ‘division of labour’ given by location. Long-distance trade often engenders markets, an 
institution which involves acts of … buying and selling. (1944/2001, p. 58) 
As the foundation of the self-regulating market, then, supply-and-demand prices have a 
definite historical origin. As an ideal entity of no fixed address, “the” Market is a product of 
political and cultural revolutions. 
The contributors to this Volume all acknowledge the existence of the Market in various 
degrees of approximation, but they also talk about prices as the product of actually-existing 
markets. We use this expression to point, first, to the role that physical marketplaces still play 
in the lives of many people around the world. More generally, though, we use the expression 
to signal the distinction between the Market as a theoretical and ideological construct, and 
markets as phenomena that people encounter in their daily lives through myriad material and 
symbolic engagements. Similarly, we suggest a distinction between market prices—those 
(partially) determined by supply and demand and discursively constructed according to the 
tenets of Marginalism—and actually-existing prices determined by complex social, cultural and 
political processes. In the Volume, Valenciano-Mañé provides a vivid example of the latter; in 
Equatorial Guinea, exchange relations in markets are embedded in social configurations of 
mutuality, but also power and patronage. An anthropological approach to the politics and 
ethics of prices thus needs to “transcend the pseudo-universalism of bourgeois economic 
categories by demonstrating through ethnography that they constitute just another local 
model” (Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 98). 
Our use of the notion of actually-existing markets draws directly on the Polanyian tradition. 
As Polanyi famously argued: “The human economy … is embedded and enmeshed in 
institutions, economic and non-economic” (1957b, p. 250). Rather than a separated, self-
regulating domain of society, then, markets are empirically part of “substantive” economies, 
that is, they are one part of all the concrete ways in which human societies organize 
themselves to provide for their material wants. Adopting this approach has two important 
consequences. First, the materials analyzed in this Volume can be considered local stories 
and local conversations about prices, about what determines them and what they determine 
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in people’s lives. Rather than being philosophical or scientific theories of the just price, these 
conversations are “folk” theories, made up of local models and symbolic orders (Gudeman, 
1986; Sahlins, 1976). Taken together, this evidence forms part of a “collective commentary” 
on the realms of economy and society, and on the “ideas, values, processes and institutions” 
that make up the two realms (Carrier, 2012, p. 3). The second consequence stems from the 
first and signals an approach to commensuration that is not based on abstract models or 
formulae, but rather on the particular socio-cultural contexts of a given time and place. We 
refer to this as socially-mediated commensuration. 
Socially-mediated commensuration often involves forms of regulation of the “unfettered” 
Market, usually aimed at meeting or defending the needs of specific groups in society. Markets 
have existed for millennia, but their scope was historically limited both in terms of the goods 
that were sold in them and the practices that were allowed. From the point of view of 
economics, actors in the market are anonymous and, in principle, simultaneously buyers and 
sellers. In the past, though, and in many developing countries still today, people have come 
to the marketplace with definite social and personal identities, some primarily to sell their 
products, others primarily to buy (e.g. Alexander & Alexander, 1991; see Valenciano-Mañé, 
this volume). Farmers from one area may bring to market a fixed amount of produce and sell 
it no matter what the price; buyers from one particular village might make their purchases 
under similar constraints. In these markets,  
most participants are members of house economies. Buyers are consumers for the home. Sellers usually 
aim to sustain themselves and sometimes to make a profit. They are house-businesses. The takins [sic] are 
not profits or wages but a return to support the house. (Gudeman, 2016, p. 18) 
Customary practice or official regulation may determine prices in these markets, which 
therefore do not depend exclusively on supply and demand. This is not to suggest that price 
variations do not occur in them on a daily basis; they do (Guyer, 2004, p. 84). Most markets 
in the course of history have fallen in an intermediate, “hybrid,” category between price-less 
systems, like the Kula Ring of the Trobriand Islands, and the Self-Regulating Market of 
neoclassical economists. In these markets, prices are often regulated by authorities.  
 19 
Actually-existing markets, then, are markets in which considerations other than demand, 
price and cost affect what is produced and to whom it goes. In these markets, “participants 
may act partly on ‘rational economic grounds’ … but they also reach decisions on the basis of 
other, different … considerations” (Neale, 1957, pp. 371, 369). Anthropologists have 
documented a variety of these phenomena and all our contributors are concerned, at some 
level, with forms of price regulation, whether by government (Dinler, Ripoll, Yalçın-Heckmann), 
by powerful individuals (Valenciano-Mañé), by civil society (Orlando), by legal mechanisms 
(Prentice), or through personal social relations (all our contributors). Socially-mediated 
commensuration thus often goes hand in hand with control over how goods and services are 
allocated and with restrictions on production for gain as the driver of economic activity 
(Beckert, 2011, pp. 41–45). These elements are also found in another important 
anthropological tradition that has historically dealt with the issue of the just price, that of moral 
economy. 
This approach examines political struggles in periods of transition, as capitalist relations 
reconfigure customary local practices (Scott, 1976, 1985; Thompson, 1971, 1991). During 
these times, protests are directed against the extension of market principles, which Thompson 
labels a “demoralizing of the theory of trade” (1991, p. 201). Moral economy is therefore a 
critique of the laissez-faire economic model. As the self-adjusting economy gained ground in 
eighteenth century England, so intermediaries moved into what had previously been direct 
and regulated market places and began to practice forestalling and bulk-buying, interloping 
between the “fair dealer” and the “honest consumer” (p. 208). Under this scenario, market 
procedures become less transparent, revealing flaws in the logic of the economic model based 
upon supply and demand. Consumers noted a failure of prices to fall after an abundant 
harvest, and basic grains became unaffordable to poorer sections of society. In response, the 
moral economy of the poor asserted a traditional view of social norms and obligations, so that, 
historically, moral demands were articulated in terms of paternalism. Using a general notion 
of rights and a selective reconstruction of the paternalistic model, the English crowd 
legitimized the widespread and disciplined actions in which they set and enforced a just price 
 20 
for bread. In sum, Thompson identifies a “deeply held conviction that prices ought, in times of 
dearth, to be regulated, and that the profiteer put himself outside society” (p. 229, original 
emphasis). 
Since Thompson popularized the term, moral economy has been applied to an ever-
widening range of issues within anthropology and across the social and human sciences, so 
that it has become generalized and could be held to describe any social relation (Fassin, 2009; 
Hann, 2010; Trentmann, 2007). Against this trend, Marc Edelman (2012) argues that moral 
economy opposes the erosion of livelihoods by the spread of capitalist relations and is 
articulated in terms of the morality (or otherwise) of social forms and relationships, while for 
James Carrier (2018) the term signifies ongoing relations of obligation that are at once social 
and economic. Both these usages capture important aspects of moral economy, and it is easy 
to see why the term has been adopted by economic anthropologists. 
In his own extended discussion of the problem of definition, Thompson concurs that moral 
economy describes how economic relations are regulated according to non-monetary norms 
(1991, p. 340, see also Carrier, 2018), and that it concerns the “social dialectic of unequal 
mutuality” (1991, p. 344). This infers a definition that presupposes social tensions, or 
employing his terminology, “the way in which class relations are negotiated” (p. 344). In other 
words, moral economy is a political struggle oriented toward rolling back inequalities and 
unjust prices as these are generated by unrestrained markets (Polanyi, 1944/2001). 
Conversely, it is also about establishing just prices through ongoing mutuality and sustained 
social obligations. While this problematizes just prices and allows for contestation, in the next 
section we explore deeper tensions and contradictions in the politics and ethics of just prices. 
 
The paradox of the just price 
Although they differ on the principles and mechanisms for achieving it, the three approaches 
to the just price discussed thus far—market value, labor value and social value—all share the 
assumption that fairness in exchange is a reasonable goal. A different approach would deny 
the possibility of a just price and the commensurability of use into exchange value. In this 
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section we retrieve the question of the antinomy between use and exchange, and then show 
how this impacts on, and is refracted into, anthropological discussions. 
We find an early example of this problem in Thomas Aquinas, who noted that “if a man 
wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing 
twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin 
of injustice” (1953, pp. 148–149). This medieval expression of the conundrum of selling the 
wine or drinking it, but not both, is eloquently expressed in Pratt’s ethnography (this volume). 
The problem of the antinomy between use and exchange goes back to Aristotle’s observation 
about the two uses of a shoe. It is not clear whether he thought these uses could be dissolved 
into one. For Meikle (1995, pp. 13–17), Aristotelian metaphysics made commensuration 
logically impossible since qualities of use can make objects similar or dissimilar, but quantities 
exchanged can only be equal or unequal. Use qualities and exchangeable quantities thus 
describe different and irreconcilable features of objects. This reading of Aristotle links to Marx. 
In critiquing capitalism as an experience of alienation, Marx built his argument by insisting 
on an irreducible gap between use and exchange (Meikle, 1995; Žižek, 2004). Exchange 
value, for him, “manifests itself as something totally independent of its use value” (Marx, 
1867/1990, p. 128). There is no doubt in his mind as to the mechanism: “In money every 
qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished” (p. 229). By nature, objects have 
qualities that render them useful in satisfying human wants; they exist only as physical 
properties that are realized in their consumption. It is under the conventions of capitalism that 
use and exchange are brought into conditions of relative and equivalent value as quantities 
(pp. 125–126; see also Narotzky, 1997, pp. 65–66). This fact creates a moral difficulty.  
Marx’s discussion of the relative value of a coat to linen in the first volume of Capital is, at 
least in one account (Stallybrass, 1997), an expression of his experience of the incompatibility 
between use and exchange value in his private life. Struggling to support his family, Marx often 
pawned his coat to buy food. When he wore it, he was warm and could meet the dress code 
of the British Library to work, but he could not eat. When he pawned his coat, he could 
exchange it for food but could not wear it and could not work. As an exchange value, his coat 
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had abstract equivalence but at the expense of its useful function: “[w]hat defines the coat as 
a commodity for Marx is that you cannot wear it and it cannot keep you warm” (Stallybrass, 
1997, p. 183).  
The vivid description of Marx and his coat forces us to confront the gap between use and 
exchange value, and the necessity to negotiate the irreconcilable tension between them. Here 
we also locate a problematisation of the just price. For Slavoj Žižek, the two kinds of value 
exemplify antinomies. Not only can one not be reduced to the other, but we should “assert 
antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not as a determinate position 
as opposed to another position, but as an irreducible gap between the positions” (2004, p. 
121). Žižek is claiming we cannot hold both views together; instead there is a “leap of faith” 
between them. This leap reinstates Aristotle’s problem of the two uses of the shoe discussed 
above. It presents a challenge to conventional exchange theory because clearly much 
economic activity involves forging some relation—or creating a bridge, to use Miller’s (2006) 
terminology—between use and exchange value, then expressing that in money, and finding 
grounds to claim the expression is just. 
A possible way around the problem of antinomy is offered by Stephen Gudeman (2008), 
who suggests that commensuration is only ever possible in practice, rather than in theory. 
Taking the Marxian notion of fetishism from the realm of production, he applies it to that of 
exchange, arguing that prices are “the fetishes of the market.” In his view, price has an almost 
magical ability; it “brings together different qualities and transforms them into a quantitative 
equivalence” (2008, p. 50), thus achieving an unlikely union of intent between seller and buyer. 
Because this union is so improbable, though, prices are unstable and constantly in flux. 
Gudeman believes that in an effort to make sense of them, we invent “stories” that legitimate 
prices. Historically, these have been variously called supply-and-demand, labor value, fair 
trade and, of course, the just price. Commodities, however, have no referent other than their 
shifting price, at least in the market realm, where prices “define the identity of a thing” (p. 63). 
Orlando (this volume) develops several of these themes in relation to fair trade in Sicily, 
highlighting the simultaneous use of the labor value and marginal utility “story.” 
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Gudeman’s argument about price fetishism is not entirely different from a Marginalist 
account, though he criticizes neoclassical economics for its untenable assumptions about 
utility and rational preference (2008, p. 53–54). We are left, therefore, with the idea that 
markets make prices, period. Knowing why or how is impossible, at least at a theoretical level. 
What we can do, suggests Gudeman, is look at how commensuration is achieved in practice. 
Instead of starting with the assumption shared by the two great modernist approaches that a 
common metric exists before exchange—relative preference or labor value—which makes 
things commensurate, we should turn the problem on its head and assume that things are 
incommensurate until we create a relationship between them, that “market commensuration 
emerges in trade where we use a conventional scale to mark their relation. Market 
commensuration is an after-the-fact register” (2008, p. 52). In other words, “the act of trade 
creates the necessity of comparing” (p. 54, see also 2016, pp. 110–112). 
The emptiness of prices explains not only the creation of narratives in economic theory, but 
also in the world of marketing and advertising. In order to fill prices of substantive content, 
corporations craft stories about the products they sell. Invariably positive, the images and 
sounds in question add a further layer of obfuscation to the commodity. In line with the 
neoclassical view of the market as an anonymous supply-demand-price mechanism, 
corporations have no responsibility for the conditions of production of their products and are 
free to make optimistic claims. Similarly, consumers have no duty to know anything about the 
negative effects of their choices. If prices are to reflect these aspects—these untold stories—
external restraints need to be applied. This is a political problem as much as it is a 
philosophical and a practical one. States and supra-state entities may legislate in this domain, 
as we have already noted, though this form of action encounters considerable obstacles. 
Another possibility is for civil society to act inside, but also outside, the market. According to 
Gudeman: “[p]rice fetishism can only be contested by local actions that resist anonymous, 
competitive trade by limiting markets and relinking buyers and sellers” (2008, pp. 65–66). He 
cites the example of fair trade as one initiative that promotes transparency by forming an 
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alliance between those who buy a product and those who make it, while also recognizing that 
such forms of mutuality are still based on the images used in advertising. 
Price fetishism neatly captures an important experience in market societies, namely how 
price comes to represent and allow comparison both between products and against monetary 
value. However, it is less helpful in capturing the exploitation and marginalization common in 
capitalist relations. That is, price fetishism can show how market prices appear to be just, but 
not how prices are thought to be, and are frequently contested as, unjust. Focusing on and 
critiquing consumer utility as a commensurating practice lays the just price entirely in the 
hands of consumer choice, potentially ignoring the struggles that workers, petty-commodity 
producers, and indeed trades-people put so much effort in to secure what they consider just 
prices. Furthermore, to say that people reify prices does not recognize that pricing things (or 
attaching a quantitative number to the qualities of objects) may be seen in itself as unjust or 
inappropriate. That is, adopting price fetishism as the sole standpoint risks an all-
encompassing view of market quantification that sidelines non-market spaces and relations; 
this is the essence of the critique of exchange value signaled by the antinomy argument.9 
 
Toward an anthropology of the just price 
In a sense, anthropology has a long track record of tackling the difference between use and 
exchange value revealed by the problem of the just price. In discussions on non-Western and 
substantive economic forms, anthropologists have proposed an uneasy distinction between 
personal exchanges oriented toward the long-term reproduction of social values and relations, 
and impersonal—alienated—exchanges based on short-term, self-interested calculation. 
Associated terms, like gift and commodity, house and corporation, community and market 
have been contrasted as analytical types, while also signaling distinctions that are important 
to many people in everyday life.10 
In Western cultures, the ideology of the gift, of households and community, evokes the 
qualities of things given and received to forge or sustain relationships. In the process, the 
monetary exchange value of the object given is commonly denied or effaced. Of course, in 
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practice people do consider the price of gifts, and how much one is prepared to spend is 
indexed to the quality of the relationship, so care is taken to ensure gifts are appropriate, 
appreciated and useful to the recipient (Miller, 2001). In that sense, gifts also have a “just 
price” to be negotiated, but it is ethically and politically important to be seen to avoid putting a 
number to the qualities of the things given when establishing or maintaining a relationship. A 
just price for a gift is an appropriate expenditure that both parties accept reflects the relation, 
and an unjust price would signal an inappropriate amount spent on a lavish gift, or too little 
expenditure on a miserly one. 
In practice, it seems, gifts and commodities are entangled, and the same object may be 
exchanged as either of the two forms at different moments in their social trajectories 
(Appadurai, 1986; Gregory, 1997; Miller, 1998). But a more fundamental question is whether 
the ideological importance of gift-like exchanges predicated on social relations are anything 
more than symbolic, in the “sense the word sometimes receives, as lacking concrete material 
effect, in short, gratuitous, i.e. disinterested but also useless” (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 176–177, 
original emphasis). For Bourdieu, the ideological distinction between gifts and commodities is 
not tenable; it is based upon misrecognition of the giver’s and the receiver’s undeclared 
calculations (p. 171). For him, the symbolic exchanges of the gift are only imagined as distinct 
and outside of economic calculation; in reality, the prestige gained from marriage alliances or 
the renown achieved through generosity conceals a reality of underlying economic interest—
symbolic capital. Hence analysis should apprehend “the perfect interconvertibility” of symbolic 
capital and economic capital (p. 178). The symbolic is part of the wider economy of practices 
characterized by strategic economism, so mutuality and obligation can and should, according 
to Bourdieu, be seen as masking exploitation and domination. 
Treating the symbolic as a form of capital undoubtedly allows description of its strategic 
and economic use to control and dominate, objectively, to use Bourdieu’s terminology. 
However, it is less able to describe how people view symbolic value subjectively, to establish 
or maintain obligations by exchanging gifts, for example. Symbolic worth can consequently be 
understood to reside both outside and inside monetary value. In that respect it is perhaps 
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useful to distinguish between symbolic value and symbolic capital. A Picasso, for example, 
has transcendent symbolic value and is priceless because it was painted by a genius and has 
aesthetic qualities, but that value also translates into monetary value or symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1977). The idea of the “small farmer” can evoke symbolic and ideological spaces 
outside capital and at the same time be rendered into symbolic capital as a marketing ploy, in 
selling fair trade coffee, for example (Luetchford, 2008). 
Gifts and the social and emotional arenas in which they circulate are thus caught in a double 
bind. On the one hand, they can signal dependency and stand accused of masking 
exploitation and inequality. In this respect they are little different, as objects, from fetishized 
commodities. When exchanged under market culture (or more precisely, through the use of 
money) questions of enumeration and the problem of just and unjust prices inevitably arise in 
the form of (in)appropriate expenditures. On the other hand, gifts, the household and the 
community are ideologically constructed outside of the problem of just prices. They signal, like 
the antinomy between use and exchange value, the possibility or the desire to escape 
enumeration, calculation and self-interest, but seem destined to be compromised.  
Where does this leave the opposition between use and exchange value? The conceptual 
and practical gap it involves may be more relevant to the sphere of consumption, which 
focuses attention on the qualities of things. Exchange value is largely effaced once the object 
has been appropriated from the realm of exchange. In a sense, this is what allows price 
fetishism to operate; once we buy something we tend to focus on its use and forget or deny 
the act of buying it. As Baudrillard once noted, this is especially the case in relation to food, 
which we incorporate as total use value (1975, p. 97, note 2). It is further emphasized in 
activities in which we produce the things we consume and so escape monetary exchange 
relations. Perhaps for this reason, we also find the primacy of use over exchange in ideas 
about the domestic economy, especially when the house produces the things it needs. In such 
economies, production for consumption reproduces an autarkic social ideal. Household 
economies, like gifts, seem to provide ideological and material refuge from problematic or 
unjust exchange relations (see Dinler, Luetchford, Pratt, Ripoll, this volume). This is because 
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avoiding monetized market exchange evades the problem of prices and of other metrics to 
convert qualities into quantities, and hence any need for commensuration. It creates an 
ideological space, an island of mutually satisfying social obligations, thanks to which the 
commodity form and the problematic of a just price is avoided. 
If we stretch the term “use value” to encompass non-material qualities, this may illustrate 
something much more general, and mundane. In their everyday market engagements, people 
shift between two frames; an appreciation of qualitative use that systematically and 
ideologically denies monetary value, and a reckoning of quantitative exchange value. We 
suggest that these two views are never finally resolved into one another and so cannot be 
held simultaneously. Rather, people in market societies switch imperceptibly, somewhat 
unconsciously, but with apparent consummate ease, between the two framings. Perhaps, 
though, the meaning and symbolic importance given to actions and exchanges predicated on 
mutual obligation provides a recurring denial of the possibility of a just price, both in theory 
and in practice. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarize, this Introduction has traced four broad approaches to the problem of 
commensuration, or how to convert the qualities of objects and people’s actions (use value) 
into quantities of money for the Market (exchange value). The first sees consumer utility and 
the balance between supply and demand as the proper measures. The second looks at the 
cost of producing goods and performing services as key elements, particularly at human labor, 
in the Marxian tradition we have emphasized. The third approach holds that market 
commensuration is always socially-mediated and that criteria for equivalence are embedded 
in different geographical and historical circumstances and forms of regulation. These three 
arguments all share the assumption that a positive—morally suitable—solution to the problem 
of commensuration and its attendant dilemmas of price composition is ultimately possible. The 
fourth approach provides instead a negative answer to this question, either by arguing that the 
gap between use and exchange value is an unbridgeable chasm which can only be crossed 
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by taking a blind leap of faith, or, more prosaically, by giving up on the search for a grand 
theoretical solution and looking at the commensurations that markets produce every day. 
Both versions of the fourth approach see prices as paradoxical, and their power as perhaps 
ultimately inevitable. One possible “political” suggestion in this line argument—to escape 
exchange value by strengthening use values of all sorts, from the house to the community—
is at best a partial solution that can only be put in practice by some people some of the time. 
Given the extent of the market realm and the undeniable reality of commensuration by trade, 
it is not surprising that such a solution emerges in the Volume mostly among people who have 
retained one foot in the peasant world (see chapters by Pratt and Ripoll). Alongside the 
problem of how to resolve commensuration (positively or negatively) lies the issue of the 
justness of the different solutions. Our exploration in this Introduction, and indeed those of the 
authors in the Volume, documents a variety of voices in this regard, from claims that prices 
are just, to counterclaims that they are often unjust, to a more radical conviction that they are 
irrevocably and intrinsically unjust. Relatedly, money and prices can be seen as pliable and 
useful means to extend human relations (Aspers & Beckert, 2013; Graeber 2001, p. 66; Hart, 
2000; Zelizer, 1994), but also as inflexible agents of injustice and exploitation. 
As anthropologists we must pay attention to the practical ways that people in different 
cultures both accept prices, when they are seen as representing the worth of objects and 
actions, and resist them, when they are not. In doing so, we need to understand the cultural 
valuations that lead to talk of “just” or “unjust” prices as socially negotiated and contingent 
processes, which emerge in particular relations and configurations of power, from the local to 
the global. These negotiations are made possible by the social structuring of markets and the 
presence of cultural forms and ideas that shape exchange. The contributors to this Volume all 
illustrate, in different ways, how this social and cultural framing is enacted in the composition 
of prices, through institutions that regulate pricing, by markets and the interactions between 
buyers and sellers, in the social networks that bind the two, and in the values that bracket off 
particular areas of life from market pricing. 
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Notes
1 Shortly before his death, Bronislaw Malinowski carried out fieldwork describing the price negotiations of rural 
markets in Mexico in a similar fashion to the ceremonial barter of his more famous Melanesian ethnography 
2 The reason we talk about “the” just price is due to the Latin concept of iustum pretium, part of a legal doctrine 
that emerged in the sixth century with Emperor Justinian’s Corpus of civil law. The Corpus described the legal 
device of laesio enormis (enormous injury), which could be used when a sale of land took place at a price of “less 
than half the just price.” During the Middle Ages, different schools of thought developed the concept, applying it to 
all kinds of sale; this work culminated with Scholasticism and Thomas Aquinas (Baldwin, 1959). Throughout this 
time, the “just price” appears to have been equated with current market prices—not those of modern anonymous 
markets, but the prices found in actual marketplaces (like town squares and itinerant fairs) that were regulated by 
central authorities (Baldwin, 1959, pp. 48, 54, 77). 
3 There are other lines of inquiry, for example those that tend to privilege price composition. 
4 After the loss of the study of ancient Greek in the early Middle Ages, Aristotle was practically unknown in 
Western Europe from around 600 to 1100CE. His teachings reached the universities of northern Europe thanks to 
the Greek texts preserved in the East and the important commentaries that Islamic scholars made on them. Islamic 
territories in the Mediterranean were a considerable source of scholarship on economic matters, with thinkers such 
as Al-Gazhali and Ibn Khaldun contributing key insights (Baeck, 1994, pp. 94–122). Ibn Khaldun’s legacy in 
particular should be considered on par with that of Thomas Aquinas. “Whereas the Scholastics were concerned to 
establish a ‘just price,’ Ibn Khaldun wanted to explain current prices. Rather than rely on ethical criteria, he 
juxtaposed empirical data and theoretical analysis” (Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 22). For the great Arab scholar, all 
wealth proceeded from human labor. If the price of wheat was higher in Spain than in North Africa, for example, it 
was because higher costs of production were incurred there. 
5 Smith did at times recognize the negative effects of markets and self-interest (Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 26). 
6  While costs of production include a variety of elements (materials, transport, taxes, etc.), from an 
anthropological perspective we focus primarily on labor due to its important place in the discipline, and because it 
opens up more overtly the political and ethical contestations around price. 
7 Smith thought that labor was the ideal measure of value because working is universal and applies to all 
commodities: “The real price of everything … is the toil and trouble of acquiring it” (Smith, 1776/1937, p. 34, cited 
in Barrera, 1997, p. 85). However, he also rejected the possibility of calculating the labor content of goods and 
services in a complex economy because of the enormous problems of measurement he felt would arise in the 
process. It was this belief that led him to talk about a long-term, “natural” price. 
8 This is not a universally held position among anthropologists. From the very beginning, some thought that the 
principles of neoclassical economics were at play also in “primitive” societies. 
9 In earlier work, Gudeman himself seems to recognize this. At a minimum, he admits, a just exchange should 
entail that someone could use the money from a sale to buy back what had originally been sold without loss, i.e. 
to turn a sale into an equivalent purchase (Gudeman & Rivera, 1990, p. 144). This is hardly ever the case, as 
peasants can attest: “If you take something to the market and sell it, you sell at a lower price than what you buy 
the same thing for” (p. 150). Something is thus “lost,” and an injustice done, when money is used as a medium of 
exchange. 
10 See for example: Carrier (1995); Godelier (1998); Gregory (1982, 1997); Gudeman (2001, 2008, 2016); 
Malinowski (1922/2014); Mauss (1924/2016); Miller (1998, 2001); Parry and Bloch (1989); Sahlins (1972, 1976); 
Strathern (1988); Weiner (1992). 
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